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Contributions to the SRF: 
What risks need to be assessed? 
Daniel Gros and Willem Pieter de Groen 
There is general agreement that the banking sector should pay for its own safety net, meaning 
that resolution and deposit guarantee funds should be financed by contributions from the banks 
themselves. This principle lies at the heart of the approach taken in the EU Directive on (national) 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) and is enshrined in the basic rules of the Single Resolution 
Fund (SRF). Moreover, there is also a consensus that contributions should be based on the risk 
profile of each bank – as an essential precondition to providing individual banks with the proper 
incentives to internalise the potential costs related to bank failure. It is, however, questionable 
whether the current methodology to calibrate contributions fully succeeds in this aim. 
The SRF was established in 2016 in the context of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The 
main aim of the SRM is to resolve banks in an orderly manner without public funds. However, 
since it is unlikely that all financing in resolution can be arranged via bail-ins and monetary 
facilities, additional funds for resolution might be required. The role of the SRF is to provide 
these funds. 
The overall target size of the SRF has been determined as 1% of covered deposits 
(approximately €60 billion). 
The contribution expected from each bank each year during the build-up phase is not just 
proportional to the covered deposits at that bank, but depends instead on a large number or 
risk indicators. In principle, it makes sense to relate contributions to risk. But the way this is 
done raises some issues. 
First, the risk indicators should not just reflect the likelihood that a bank might fail, but rather 
that the failure of a bank will require an intervention by the SRM leading to losses for the SRF. 
The ‘loss-making’ qualification is important in this context because the SRM is supposed to 
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provide funding only when an appropriate use of bail-in tools has re-established a solvent 
entity. It is of course possible that, ex post, an intervention of the SRF leads to losses, but ex 
ante, this is not a foregone conclusion. Funding a resolution after bail-in should thus be viewed 
as an investment, rather than an automatic loss. Any investment brings risks, but also a 
potential upside. This distinguishes resolution funds from deposit insurance funds. The latter 
only intervene to protect covered deposits, so any intervention by a deposit insurance fund 
thus signifies a loss.1 This difference in the nature of the intervention implies that one should 
apply different risk criteria for the contributions to a deposit insurance fund and contributions 
to a resolution fund, such as the SRF. 
A second fundamental issue is that contributions to the SRF will stop once it has reached its 
target size. But this implies that after that date, the incentive effect of contributions related to 
risk parameters will no longer operate. This second issue is a relatively straightforward 
corollary, but the first one, identifying risks for the SRF, requires more thorough analysis.  
Current methodology for setting annual contributions 
At present, the contribution of each bank to the build-up of the SRF is determined in a two-step 
procedure. 
In a first step, the annual contribution expected from the entire banking system to the SRF is 
calculated so as to reach the 1% target by 2024. In a second step, this overall amount is 
distributed across individual banks according to a combination of size, business model and risk 
characteristics. 
Small institutions with total assets of less than €1 billion pay a lump sum contribution. This 
contribution varies between €1,000 and €50,000 depending on the contribution base, i.e. total 
liabilities minus own funds and covered deposits. In 2018, this category formed the largest 
group: 49% of the 3,315 contributing institutions. 
Mid-sized institutions with total assets between €1 and €3 billion pay a combination of a lump 
sum contribution and a risk adjusted contribution. The lump sum is paid over the first €300 
million contribution base, which is identical to the maximum contribution base for small 
institutions. The risk-based contribution is calibrated over the remaining contribution base. In 
2018, this category formed the second largest group: 28% of the 3,315 contributing institutions. 
Large institutions with total assets above €3 billion pay a fully risk adjusted contribution. In 
2018, this category formed the smallest group: 21% of the 3,315 contributing institutions. 
However, they are responsible for 96% of the total contributions to the fund. 
Non-bank institutions are subject to a specific calibration of contributions. Covered bond 
financed mortgage credit institutions and investment firms form only a small share of the 
institutions subject to contributions. 
                                                        
1 If a bank is liquidated, the deposit insurance fund pays out for the covered deposits and receives in exchange a 
claim on the bank in liquidation. The maximum a deposit insurance fund can recover is the amount of deposits it 
compensated and it will thus never make a profit on its interventions. 
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The delegated regulation that determines the risk adjusted contribution of each bank to the 
SRF is based on a number of elements or ‘pillars’. The most obvious ones are risk and liquidity 
factors. Two additional ones are interconnectedness and ‘additional risk indicators’. Article 7 of 
the relevant delegated regulation also gives the weights for each factor. 
When assessing the risk profile of each institution, the resolution authority is instructed to apply 
the following weights to the risk pillars:  
I. Risk exposure (50%); 
II. Stability and variety of sources of funding (20%); 
III. Importance of an institution to the stability of the financial system or economy (10%); 
IV. Additional risk indicators to be determined by the resolution authority (20%). 
Table 1. Methodology for calculation of risk-adjusted contributions 







Leverage ratio 33% 55.56% 
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) Capital Ratio 33% 
Total Risk Exposure divided by Total Assets 33% 
PILLAR II: 
Stability and variety 
of source of funding 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio 100% 22.22% 
PILLAR IV 
Additional risk 
indicators to be 
determined by the 
resolution authority 
Risk weighted assets for market risk divided by Total Assets 5% 22.22% 
Risk weighted assets for market risk divided by CET1 5% 
Risk weighted assets for market risk divided by total risk exposure 5% 
Off-balance sheet nominal amount divided by Total Assets 5% 
Off-balance sheet nominal amount divided by CET1 5% 
Off-balance sheet nominal amount divided by total risk exposure 5% 
Derivatives exposure divided by Total Assets 5% 
Derivatives exposure divided by CET1 5% 
Derivatives exposure divided by total risk exposure 5% 
Membership in an Institutional Protection Scheme 45% 
Extent of previous extraordinary public financial support 10% 
 
The precise elements constituting each pillar are then further defined in terms of specific 
balance sheet and regulatory indicators. However, due to the unavailability of harmonised data, 
the SRB has removed several indicators from the methodology, leaving the set of indicators and 
risk-weights for the calculation of contributions in 2018 as presented in Table 1 above. 
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Risk for the SRF 
The basic approach followed so far to determine the contributions banks have to pay to the 
SRF is thus based on a number of different balance sheet and regulatory indicators, mostly 
using ratios, which constitute key elements of prudential rules. At first sight, this seems 
reasonable. However, it is not clear why these factors would adequately represent the risk for 
the SRF. 
The granting of support by the SRF is far from automatic for failing banks, as the first failures 
since the establishment of the fund have shown. Indeed, the resolution mechanism aims to 
address bank failures with private solutions or the normal insolvency proceedings (Figure 1). 
The bank will only be resolved when these are deemed inappropriate and there is a public 
interest. 
When the SRF is used, it can be used for various purposes including providing guarantees, loans, 
purchasing assets, and compensating creditors that are worse off than under normal insolvency 
procedures. However, the fund has been primarily designed for recapitalisations that are 
conditional on a minimum bail-in of liabilities (König, 2018).  
Figure 1. Factors determining the access to the SRF 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
The current methodology does not adequately capture these factors, which are those that 
determine whether a bank constitutes a risk for the SRF. It focuses primarily on the likelihood 
a bank may fail and much less on the chance of a resolution and the potential involvement of 
the SRF. For example, the covered deposits that are one of the main elements in the public 
interest assessment are exempted from the contribution base, whereas instruments that can 
be bailed in (and therefore likely to bear losses in a resolution) form a significant part of the 
base for the calibration. This means that some banks are currently paying relatively too much 
and others too little. 
The potential risks for the SRF can be estimated. For example, we calculated in 2015 the total 
losses that would have been incurred by EU banks if all banks in receipt of capital support in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis had been resolved. We found that the funds required from 
HOW TO MAKE SRF-CONTRIBUTIONS REALLY RISK BASED? | 5 
 
the SRF would have been limited. The headline finding of that study was that the total losses 
incurred by the banks needing support amounted to about €313 billion. This figure looms large 
relative to the present and future size of the SRF. But the same figure also appears small relative 
to the total balance sheet of these banks – less than 3% of total assets. There are two key 
explanations for the relatively low contribution: the SRF can only intervene after a bail-in of a 
minimum 8% of liabilities including own funds, while the funding from the SRF is limited to 5%. 
Figure 2 below shows a scatter plot with the losses on the horizontal and the hypothetical 
contribution of the SRF on the vertical axis. A best fit line can explain only about one half of the 
variability in the SRF contribution and the four big cases in the oval on the right illustrate that 
for losses around €25 billion, the contribution of the SRF could have been either zero (Fortis, 
with a low risk-weighted assets/total assets ratio) or €15 billion (Bankia). Moreover, almost all 
cases lie below 50%, meaning that in only a very few cases would the SRF have covered more 
than one half of the losses. 
Figure 2. Cumulative peak losses of banks aided and hypothetical SRF contribution  
 
Source: Own elaboration on data from De Groen and Gros (2015).  
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Making the contribution to the SRF really risk-based 
These results suggest that expected losses do not translate directly into a risk for the SRF. What 
is needed is an analysis of which characteristics of a bank imply a risk for the SRF, thus justifying 
a modification of the methodology. 
Over the next few months, CEPS will conduct an exercise to come up with a methodology for 
the annual contributions for the SRF that reflects the risks to the SRF more closely. For this we 
will estimate the risk adjustment factor, contribution base and contribution to the SRF for 
individual banks and banking groups. Moreover, we will, based on the information available on 
the resolution mechanism, design a methodology that is risk-based and assess how this would 
affect the 3,315 institutions that contribute to the SRF. The results of this exercise are expected 
in the spring of 2019. 
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